We develop a simple growth model featuring individuals' choices between general and specific skills, endogenous technological innovation, and a government subsidy for education. The two types of skills differ by their productivity and transferability: general skills are transferable across firms, while each firm-specific skill has a productivity advantage in the firm. Firms face uncertainty in their innovation activities, and the resulting heterogeneity in their labor demand makes the transferability of general skill valuable. We theoretically show that as a country catch up to the world technology frontier, firms invest more in innovation activities. This rises firms' technological uncertainty and, thus, their demands for general skills increases. As a result, especially in more advanced economies, education subsidies may enhance GDP by increasing the supply of general skills. Using aggregated data for 12 European OECD counties, we calibrate the model and compare the theoretical prediction with the data. In cross-country comparisons, we find that the returns on general skills and the impact of general education expenditure on GDP are higher in countries with higher total factor productivity. These findings support our theoretical argument of the positive relationship between firms' demand for general skills and countries' stages of development.
The model

Economic environment
The economy is composed of a continuum of a unit measure of workers, given exogenously and constant over time. Workers live for one period and spend all of their income on consumption in this period. All workers are equally endowed with one unit of efficient labor, which they supply to the intermediate goods sector inelastically. We assume that labor skills can be of two distinct types: general and sector-specific.
In every period, a unique final good is produced competitively using a continuum of mass one of intermediate goods and any other fixed factor, such as land or natural resources, as inputs. The final good is taken as the numeraire, with its price normalized to 1, and is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A i, t is the productivity of firm i, y i, t is the amount of the intermediate good used in the final good production, M t is the amount of fixed factors, and α ∈ (0, 1). A representative final good producer maximizes the profit
taking the price of the fixed factors and the intermediate good prices p i, t as given. We normalize the total supply of the fixed factors to one. Then, using the first-order condition with respect to y i, t , together with M t = 1, the inverse demand function for intermediate good i is given by:
, .
Education choices
At the beginning of their life, workers choose between general and sector-specific skills. Once a worker makes an education choice, it cannot be changed. General skills are equally productive in all sectors, while skills specific to the i-th sector can only be used in production sector i. We assume that each intermediate good is produced by a single monopoly firm and, thus, the sector-specific skills considered here can be rephrased as being firm specific. In the following analysis, we focus on firms' demand for general skills in economies at different stages of development. Thus, to simplify the argument, we assume that skill acquisition requires no direct expenditure by workers (although we relax this assumption in Section 4). Henceforth, we refer to workers with general skills as "G-skill workers" and workers with skills specific to firm i as "S i -skill workers."
Firms and technological progress
Each intermediate good production is composed of a single monopolistic firm. Further, we assume that each firm is owned by an entrepreneur who, like workers, lives for one period and consumes all of her profit. Following Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) and Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) , henceforth AAZ and VAM, respectively, we assume that the world technology frontier, Ā t , grows exogenously at rate λ, so that̄=
and characterize the technological innovation process of firm i at time t using the following linear function:
wherē− 1 is the level of the world technology frontier at time t − 1, A t−1 is the country's local technology level at time t − 1, x i, t is the level of investment of firm i at time t, and ϕ ∈ (0, 1). Here, μ i represents an idiosyncratic shock to the innovation activity of each firm i, which takes a binary value: ∈ { , }, where > ≥ 0. We denote by π ∈ (0, 1) the probability that each firm draws μ H . We suppose that the local technology frontier at period t − 1 in the country becomes common knowledge in period t. Thus, the local technology A t−1 in (2) is determined by
Further, the cost of investment in innovation takes the following form 8 :
In addition to the innovation activity, each intermediate firm i acts as a monopolist and produces intermediate good i, according to the following production function:
where s i, t and g i, t , respectively denote the numbers of S i -skill and G-skill workers employed by firm i at period t, and γ > 0 represents the relative productivity of general skills. We focus on the equilibrium where
where and are the wages paid to S-skill and G-skill workers, respectively. The productivity advantage of S-skills over G-skill is given by (5) which indicates that the productivity per unit of labor cost is higher for S-skill than G-skill workers. The assumption of perfect substitution between S-skills and G-skills means that if (5) is not satisfied, firms do not hire S-skill workers. As shown below, condition (5) is replaced by γ < 1 in this equilibrium because the equilibrium wages are the same for both skills, that is, = . However, in Section 4 and 5, we extend the model to allow for elastic labor supply, which leads to an equilibrium with ≠ .
Furthermore, we suppose that, before the shock is realized, firms need to sign wage contracts with workers, which restrict the ability of firms to fire workers or to lower the wages after the realization of the productivity shock. This is relevant in most European countries, where workers are protected against firing by employment protection regulations. This assumption enables workers to invest in relationship-specific skills because it contributes to avoiding the well-known hold-up problem: the returns on firm-specific skills are lost if a firm terminates the relationship. 9 Note that employment protection here plays a key role in guaranteeing the employment and wages of S-skill workers, but is meaningless for G-skill workers because they can move freely across firms, even after the idiosyncratic shock. That is, there is no need for both firms and G-skill workers to limit their ex post reallocation choices by using a contract. Thus, for expositional simplicity, we assume that firms are required to make contracts only with S-skill workers.
Timing of events
The timing of events in each period t is as follows. At the beginning of the period, each intermediate firm i decides how many S i -skill workers to hire, and makes a contract with these workers, that guarantees their payment and employment. We assume that the contract does not depend on the realization of idiosyncratic shocks to the firms. This implies that firms bear the overall risk of holding specific skills. The number of S i -skill workers, s i, t , and the wage paid to them, , , are determined by the contracts. Because the total number of Sskill workers is determined, the number of G-skill workers is also determined at this time. That is, we suppose that worker's education choices between general and specific skills are made at the same time. Then, each firm i realizes the productivity of innovation process ∈ { , }. Based on the realized productivity level, the firm decides on the level of investment x i, t and whether to hire additional G-skill workers. Then, the number of G-skill workers employed in firm i, g i, t , their wage, , , and x i, t are determined.
The important assumption here is that before observing the idiosyncratic shock μ i , the payments and employment of S-skill workers are guaranteed by contracts. A similar specification of firm specific skills is employed by Gervais, Livshits, and Meh (2008) . Their specification well describes the productivity-transferability trade-off between specific and general skills. Equation (4) and (5) shows that S i -skill is more productive in terms of a unit cost than a general skill in the i-th good production and, thus, firms wish to secure a productive labor force. On the other hand, G-skill workers play a complementary role in the ex post efficiency of production by moving to high productive sectors. Note that S-skill workers are protected from outside shocks by long-term contracts. Therefore, it is only firms that face the trade-off in their hiring decisions.
Before presenting the main analysis, several properties of the equilibrium wages are now apparent. First, because intermediate goods firms are ex-ante homogeneous, all firms offer the same wage and hire the same number of S-skill workers, that is, , = , and s i, t = s j, t hold for all ≠ ∈ [0, 1]. Second, G-skill workers are hired competitively by firms who seek additional labor. Because G-skill workers are equally productive across firms, if firm i and j demand G-skill workers, , = , must hold in equilibrium. Finally, because the aggregate state of the economy is not affected by productivity shocks to each firm, workers can perfectly predict the equilibrium wages, and , when making their education choices. In order for workers to be indifferent between acquiring G-skill and S-skill, both skills must be paid the same wage. It, together with condition (5), indicates that the productivity advantage of S-skill workers is ensured by γ < 1.
Equilibrium
In this section, we study how the share of G-skill workers varies with the economy's distance to the world technology frontier. Here we assume that γ < 1. As discussed in the previous section, even though G-skill workers are less productive than S-skill workers are, and are perfectly substitutable, = (≡ ) must hold when firms employ both S-skill and G-skill workers in equilibrium. The transferability of general skills is a key determinant of the value of general skills relative to that of firm-specific skills.
Further, we find that the ex post realization of firms are either high productivity firms with μ H , or low productivity firms with μ L . Hence, they can be distinguished by i = H, L. For simplicity, we assume that μ L = 0 for type-L firms, and denote the productivity of type-H firms as μ H = μ > 0.
Innovation and demand for general skills
The firms' problem is divided into two stages: before and after observing the productivity shock. In the second stage, based on the values of μ i and s t determined in the first stage, firm i chooses g i, t and x i, t to maximize its profit:
Substituting (4) into the above expression yields
where ≡ /̄1 − and , ≡ , /̄. Further, define ≡ /̄∈ (0, 1] as an inverse measure of the country's distance to the world technology frontier. Therefore, the innovation process (2) can be rewritten as
From (6) and (7), the second-stage problem of firm i can be expressed as follows:
Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions with respect to g i, t and x i, t are, respectively,
Substituting (8) into (9), we obtain
From (10), we have that x i, t increases in a t−1 . That is, as in AAZ and VAM, the firms enhance their innovation activities as the country approaches the world technology frontier. On the other hand, type-L firms choose x L,t = 0 because they gain no benefit from investing in innovation activity. Therefore, the technology levels of type-H and type-L firms are
Clearly, we have that a H, t > a L, t . In other words, type-H firms can develop and employ more advanced technology than type-L firms can. Further, from (3), we have that a H, t = a t holds in period t + 1 because the type-H firms are the local technology frontier in each period. Thus, the law of motion of the (inverse) measure of the country's distance to the frontier, a t , can be derived using (11) (see Section 3.4).
Even though we focus on the equilibrium in which both general and specific skills are demanded, type-L firms never hire G-skill workers (see Appendix A for a formal proof). Intuitively, because type-H firms enjoy higher productivity, they produce more goods and demand more labor than type-L firms do. Because S-skill workers are more cost-effective in production than G-skill workers, firms in the first stage hire sufficient S-skill workers so that they do not have to hire G-skill workers, even in the case of being type-L. At the same time, type-H firms seek additional labor and, thus, hire G-skill workers to cope with the labor shortage in the second stage. 10 Therefore, we have
and g L,t = 0.
Demand for specific skills
Before the shock is realized, firms in the first stage decide how many S-skill workers to hire so as to maximize their expected profits. Substituting (13) and g L,t = 0 into (6), we derive the revenues of type-H and type-L firms as functions of s t , as follows:
The firms' problem in their first stage can be written as
We see from the above maximization problem that the existence of an interior solution of s t requires that / < 1. Alternatively, g H,t = g L,t = 0 is realized. Intuitively, 1/γ units of G-skill workers can be replaced with a single unit of S-skill workers. That is, by hiring an additional single unit of S-skill workers in the first stage, firms can reduce, as expected, of payments for G-skill workers. If this is always higher than the marginal cost from hiring a single unit of S-skill workers, w t , firms never employ G-skill workers. However, a world with no general skills seems unrealistic and, hence, we assume in the subsequent analysis that
Under assumption (14) , the interior solution of s t is given by:
Finally, denote by t and t the aggregate demand for G-skill and S-skill workers, respectively. From (13) and (15), we have
Further, from (16) and (17), the relative demand for G-skill workers can be expressed as
wherẽ= , / , represents the technology gap between type-H and type-L firms. Here, (18) shows that the relative demand for G-skill workers increases in the technology gap, and is the key factor in firms' demands for general skills. The technology gap̃t can be interpreted as the measure of uncertainty that firms face about future productivity. That is, firms tend to place more importance on transferable skills than they do on productive skills as the uncertainty about future technology increases. Therefore, firms demand more general skills as the technology gap between the success and failure of innovation increases.
The feature of this model is that the uncertaintỹt is determined endogenously. Our next step is to examine how a change in the distance to the frontier affects the technology gap and the relative demand for general skills.
Labor market equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium composition of the labor force between the two types of skills. Because we suppose that the total labor supply is fixed at 1, labor market clearing requires + = 1. Substituting (16) and (17) into the labor market clearing condition yields the market clearing wage:
Combining (19) with (11) and (12), we find that the equilibrium level of̃t satisfies the following equation:
The equilibrium composition of skills is determined by (18) and (20) . We see from (20) that̃increases in a t−1 . The positive relation betweeñt and a t−1 stems from the size of the technological spillover from the world technology frontier. As seen from (2), when a country is a long way from the world technology frontier, the major determinant of firms' technologies is the spillover of the frontier technology. That is, firms' innovation does not contribute significantly to their technologies in the early stages of development. However, the closer the economy is to the frontier, the higher is the importance of innovation as a determinant of firms' technologies and, thus, the technology gap between type-H and type-L firms increases. However, note that an increase in a t−1 does not always expand the demand for general skills. Equation (18) indicates that we have = 0 for small values of̃t, that is, for small values of a t−1 . In other words, there exist such that the number of G-skill workers is zero when −1 <̂. The next lemma shows the existence of the threshold value,̂∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 1 Let̂≡
, and suppose that (14) and >̂hold. Then, there existŝ∈ (0, 1), such that for all −1 ∈ (̂, 1], the number of workers with general skills is strictly positive.
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix B. It implies that general skills are beneficial for economies that are closer to the frontier, that is, for more developed countries. As shown in Appendix B, >̂guarantees the existence of̂∈ (0, 1). From the above discussion, together with Lemma 1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
Suppose that (14) and >̂hold. Further, assume that̂< −1 < 1.
Then, firms' relative demand for workers with general skills, / , is higher when a t−1 is higher (i.e. when the economy is closer to the world technology frontier).
Proposition 1 is obtained directly from (18), (20) , and Lemma 1. It argues that the relative importance of general skills increases as the country approaches the world technology frontier. The driving force behind the growing demand for general skills is the increase iñt. As discussed above, when the country is closer to the frontier, firms gain relatively less from the frontier technology, but gain more from the local technology. Hence, type-H firms increase their investment in innovation. This leads to large technological uncertainty for firms and, thus, transferable skills become more important than technical expertise.
The result shown in Proposition 1 complements an emerging body of literature that emphasizes the importance of basic knowledge through general education, especially during times of rapid technological progress. 11 The heart of their critique is that specific skills become obsolete more quickly with the emergence of new technology and, thus, the need for general skills grows. Consistently with their argument, we have, from (18) and (20) , that an increase in innovation efficiency (μ) increases the demand for general skills. However, we focus not on skill obsolescence, but on the change in firms' demand for skill transferability. The relative productivity of specific skills compared to that of general skills (1/γ) is fixed and assumed to be greater than 1. In spite of this, accelerating innovative activities increases the importance of labor flexibility to unpredictable changes in industrial structure and, hence, increases the demand for workers with general skills.
Equilibrium dynamics
In the comparative statics analysis of the previous subsection, we showed that the number of G-skill workers increases as the country approaches to the technology frontier. We now explore the dynamics of a t . Substituting (19) , (12), and a H,t = a t into (11) yields
We assume that the follower countries do not overtake the frontier; that is, we suppose that the steady-state value a * satisfies a * ≤ 1. In the next proposition, we summarize some of the properties of the transitional dynamics and the steady state of a t .
Proposition 2 Let̄≡
, and supposê< ≤̄holds. Then, the economy with initial state ∈ (̂, 1] converges monotonically to the unique stable steady state, where its distance to the world technology frontier is weakly positive (i.e. a * ≤ 1).
As shown in Appendix C, a sufficiently large value of ∈ ( , 1) guarantees the existence of the non-empty interval [,] . Here, ≤̄guarantees a unique and stable steady state, where the value of a * is weakly less than 1. Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium dynamics. It follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 that if 0 ∈ (̂, * ), then the economy starts with a larger stock of specific skills, increases the ratio of workers with general skills over time, and approaches the world technology frontier. 
Extensions and policy analyses
The analysis so far has established a simple theoretical framework for understanding the importance of the transferability of labor skills in more developed countries. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, countries have actually adopted very different schooling structures, even in the most advanced nations. Further, the previous model is not directly applicable to the analysis of educational policies in each country because we did not pay much attention to households' educational choices. To address this problem, we extend the previous model to a more general setting in which workers with different initial abilities choose between general and specific types of education. With this extension, the equilibrium wages different between education groups, as is consistent with the widely observed wage premium for general education graduates. 12 The extension also allows us to relax the theoretical assumption of γ < 1, which indicates that individuals with a vocational education are more productive than those with a general education. Further, we examine the impact of a change in the education policy, which is captured by the change in the relative subsidies for general and specific types of education. In the following analysis, we focus on the steady-state equilibrium where a t ≤ 1 remains constant over time.
We first introduce workers' preferences, following the work of Krueger and Kumar (2004b) . There is a utility cost, C(θ) = 1/θ, of obtaining a general education, which depends on a worker's innate ability ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that θ is uniformly distributed across the population, and that the the ability is irrelevant to workers' productivity. The heterogeneity of workers' ability yields the wage differentials between education groups; that is, does not coincide with in equilibrium. We suppose that workers' preferences are represented by the utility
when the worker chooses general skills. On the other hand, = log + log , when the worker chooses specific skills. Here, S g and S s represent the government subsidies for general and specific types of education, respectively, and ν > 0 denotes the relative efficiency of the education subsidy for general education. 13 Then, we identify the worker,, who is indifferent between acquiring general and specific skills, as follows = .
All workers indexed by ∈ [0,] receive a specific education, while workers with (, 1] receive a general education. Denoting as̄the total supply of G-skill workers, the above expression can be rewritten as follows:
Although we do not model the government expenditure, the simplification can be justified by assuming the government collecting taxes to finance education, through a proportional labor income tax. As shown above, the equilibrium composition of general and specific skills is determined by the ratio of wages and the ratio of education subsidies. That is, total government expenditure and the labor income tax rate do not matter for the equilibrium allocations and, thus, for simplicity, we do not explicitly model them. We continue our analysis on the equilibrium, where there are strictly positive numbers of G-skill and S-skill workers, as in the previous section. Note that γ in this model does not have to be lower than 1 as long as (5) holds. If γ > 1 holds, it means that general skills are more productive than specific skills. Nevertheless, firms still have an incentive to contract with S-skill workers before the productivity shock because their productivity per unit of labor cost is higher than G-skill workers. That is, even if γ > 1, the productivity-transferability tradeoff remains from the perspective of the demand side of the labor market. Further, rewriting (5) yields γ < wp (≡ / ). This means that the wage premium for general skills, wp, is higher than the relative productivity of general skills, γ, because the G-skill wage includes payment for their skill transferability. Using this relation, we can estimate the size of the transferability wage premium from the gap between wp and γ, that is, the transferability premium = − .
We return to this issue in Section 5. We relegate the technical derivation of the firms' profit maximizing decisions to Appendix D, because they are much the same as the previous derivation. As shown in Appendix D, the total demand for G-skill workers in the steady state can be represented by
and the total demand for S-skill workers is
Because we analyze a stationary equilibrium, we drop the time subscript from all variables. The labor market clearing conditions arē= for G-skill workers, and 1 −̄= for S-skill workers. Let us denote by g * the steady-state equilibrium value of the number of G-skill workers. Dividing both sides of (24) by (25), and using these market-clearing conditions yields *
Moreover, by substituting w s /w g of (22) into (26), we have *
wherẽ= / . Finally, the dynamic equation (35) in Appendix D, evaluated at the steady state, is represented
Further, substituting w g of (24), together with = * and = 1 − * , into (28), we obtain
Here, g * and a * in the steady-state equilibrium are determined from (27) and (29). Appendix E shows that the dynamic structure of a t is much the same as that in the previous section. The results of the comparative statics with respect to the relative education subsidies,, are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
The number of workers with general skills, g * , and the relative productivity to the frontier, a * , increase in(= / ).
The formal proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix E. The first key finding in this proposition is that, although it may be obvious, the number of G-skill workers increases as the subsidy for general education increases. This is because a higher general education subsidy makes workers more willing to supply general skills for a lower wage premium and, thus, makes the threshold abilitȳlower. On the other hand, the positive relation between a * and̃is non-trivial. It indicates that an increase in the general education subsidy improves the steady-state level of technology. Therefore, the present model shows that an increase in the supply of G-skill workers enhances the innovation activities of firms, and thus, improves the technology level.
Although there is no fundamental change in the dynamic system from that described in Section 3, we cannot rule out the possibility of the existence of multiple steady states in our analytical work. In the numerical study in the next section, however, we confirm the uniqueness of the stable steady state using the data for the sample countries. 14 Thus, in the following analysis, we suppose that economies are located at the stable steady state.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we explore how the total output of the economies are affected by the education subsidy on general education. Although Proposition 3 shows that a * increases in, we cannot conclude that a higher general education subsidy always increases the gross domestic product of the economy. This is because if general skills are less productive than specific skill, an increase in G-skill workers decreases the total labor supply of the economy. Thus, it is meaningful to explore whether and how an emphasis on a general education subsidy contributes to countries' GDP. Our final goal is to estimate the effect of the marginal increase iñon GDP. We assume that the change iñdoes not affect the total government expenditure on education.
The system of (22), (26), and (29) contains 11 variables. Using the available data set for 12 European countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 15 , we first determine the values of (g * , w g /w s ,, a * ) for each country. The parameters describing the production technology, (λ, ϕ, α, π) , are chosen to satisfy broadly observable empirical evidence. The remaining three parameters, (γ, ν, μ), which are model-specific parameters, are derived from the three equations, (22), (26), and (29), and the eight predetermined variables. Then, we estimate the impact of a 1% increase iñon the GDP of each country.
Data
Our primary data source is the Education at a Glance series: OECD indicators, which provides a rich description of education indicators per education type (general/vocational). Education at a Glance (2014) provides the relative earnings of workers aged 25-64 (normalizing the income of adults with upper secondary education to 100). These are given for university and non-university tertiary categories 16 and, thus, we regard the former as the general type of education and the latter as the specific (vocational) type of education. Although the OECD also classifies secondary education into the same two categories for some data, we cannot obtain the wage gap between secondary general and vocational education graduates. Thus, we use the tertiary wage gap as a proxy for / . As such, we obtain a general education wage premium ≡ / = 185/143 ≃ 1.29 for Austria, for example.
The data for the relative education subsidỹfor each country is also extracted from Education at a Glance (2014), which provides the annual expenditure per student by educational institution. Although it makes sense to use data on tertiary education to ensure consistency with the wage data, some countries have no data on tertiary education expenditure by general/vocational category. Thus, following Krueger and Kumar (2004b) , we use governmental expenditure on all secondary education as a proxy for S s , and expenditure on all tertiary education as a proxy for S g . 17 Then, the relative subsidy for Austria, for example, is calculated as = 14895/13607 ≃ 1.09. Education at a Glance (2014) also provides data on the educational attainment of the labor force for OECD countries. It provides information on the share of the population aged 25-64 having completed general or vocational education, at both the secondary and the tertiary levels. However, in addition to tertiary type B graduates, we regard all upper secondary graduates as S-skill workers. Then, for example, 60.0% of population in Austria are regarded as having specific skills, and 12.7% have general skills. Thus, we obtain the number of G-skill workers as * = 12.7/72.7 ≃ 0.17 for Austria, and g * of the other countries are determined in the same way. 18 Finally, a proxy for the inverse measure of the distance to the frontier, a * , is defined as the total factor productivity (TFP) of each country divided by the TFP of the United States. We use the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0 data set, which gives the TFP levels in 2014 for several countries at current purchasing power parity relative to the United States. The values of (g * , wp,, a * ) for 12 countries are summarized in Table 1 . 
Predetermined parameters
Next, we choose the values of the technological parameters, (λ, ϕ, α, π) . The majority of studies employing the distance-to-frontier model take the United States as the frontier country and, thus, we regard λ as the US TFP growth rate. Let us suppose that one model period corresponds to 15 years. The Penn World Table 9 .0 data set shows that the average US TFP growth rate (at constant national prices, 2011 = 1) is 0.763% per year for the period 2000-2014. Thus, the growth rate of the frontier economy is set to = (1 + 0.00763) 15 − 1 ≃ 0.1208.
The share parameter α in the production function is set to 0.7. Because α represents the labor share of the final product (the sum of workers' income and entrepreneurs' profits) and, thus, a choice of α = 0.7 seems reasonable, as is commonly used. In the latter part of this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results to different values of α. The values of the spillover parameter ϕ and the share of type-H firms π are determined simultaneously from (2) . We see from the expression that, in the frontier economy, the TFP of the type-L sector,̄, , grows at rate ϕ; that is,̄,
On the other hand, the growth of the frontier economy is driven by innovation activities of the type-H sector in the frontier economy. Hence, we havē,
For information on the US industries' TFP performance, we use the Bureau of Labor Statistics data set (US Department of Labor), which provides US output per employee data for 157 four-digit manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. We calculate the average TFP growth rate for the period 2000-2014 for each sector, and then rank them based on the growth rate. Here, we regard the top π ratio of industries as the type-H sector, and define the lowest value as̄, /̄− 1 . Similarly, we define the lowest TFP growth rate among the bottom 1 − π industries as̄, /̄− 1 . To ensure consistency with (31), the lowest value of the top π ratio of industry groups must be consistent with 1 + λ. The closest value is obtained by setting the top 122 industries as type-H. Then, we have , / −1 = 1.1222 (the actual value of 1 + λ is 1.1208). Thus, we set π = 122/157. Then, the lowest TFP growth rate of the bottom 35 industries is obtained as 0.6384, which is used as the value of ϕ, according to (30).
Calibration
Now, we calibrate the set of parameters (γ, ν, μ) by matching the above key statistics from the data to the steadystate characteristic of the model in Section 4. The estimates of ν, γ, and μ are derived from (22), (26), and (29), respectively. As shown in Table 3 , the estimated values of γ are strictly greater than one for all countries: they range from 1.06 for Netherlands to 1.63 for Hungary. That is, the estimates show that general education graduates are more productive than vocational education graduates. 19 This is mainly because we set wp using the wage differentials of tertiary graduates, which will higher than that of upper-secondary or secondary graduates.
Most importantly, however, our estimates satisfy γ < wp; that is, the wage gap between G-and S-skill workers is greater than their productivity gap. In other words, a positive transferability premium of general skills defined in (23) is observed for all countries. It means that our dataset supports the equilibrium where specific skills are more cost-effective in production than general skills.
The final row of Table 3 gives the transferability premium's share of the wage differentials, which is highest in Germany (4.6%) and lowest in Hungary (0.5%). Interestingly, as shown in Figure 3 , we find a positive relation between (wp − γ)/wp and a * . This observation leads to the hypothesis that in countries closer to the frontier, the supply of general skills is insufficient from the perspective of the output level because the demand for transferable labor force is higher in those countries. We test the hypothesis by examining the impact of an increase in the supply of general skills on GDP in the next subsection. 
Impacts of an education subsidy on GDP
Now, we examine impact of an educational policy on the economy. Our primary interest here is to examine how an increase in transferable skills contributes to GDP. Note, however, that the above estimates of γ > 1 mean that G-skill workers have a higher productive skill than that of S-skill workers. That is, an increase in the number of G-skill workers increases the GDP, not only by improving transferability, but also by reinforcing the total labor input in the economy. Here, we focus on the former effect and, hence, we use the output per effective unit of labor ≡ /( * + * ) as an objective measure in our analysis of the impact of a general education subsidy. Rewriting the definition of final good production in (1), together with * = 1 − * , yields,
Four steady-state variables in (32), g * , a H , y H , and y L , are affected by the increase in: the former three variables increase in, while y L decreases in. We calculate the changes in g * and t caused by a 1% increase in. The results are summarized in Table 4 . The result shows that a 1% increase iñincreases t in all countries, even though t is defined as the output per effective unit of labor. That is, even after controlling the change in total labor force, the increase in the fraction of general skills through subsidies rises the total output. Surprisingly, we cannot find clear relations between the values of g * and the change rate of t and between the change rate of g * and the change rate of t . Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia have a relatively small share of general education graduates and, thus, a marginal increase in a general education subsidy increases the general education share in these countries significantly. However, despite the higher change rates of g * , the general education subsidy has less impact on t in these countries. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4 , there is a strong and positive relation between the change rate of t and the transferability premium ((wp − γ)/wp). These observations indicate that a key determinant of the effect of the general education subsidy on t is not the absolute size of the general education share, but rather the size of firms' relative demand for general skills. In addition, Figure 5 shows that change rate of t is higher in countries that are closer to the frontier (i.e. countries with higher a * ). The reasoning behind this observation is given in Figure 3 . The figure suggests the possibility of a short supply of general skills in relatively high TFP countries, such as Germany, France, and Switzerland. In fact, a relative increase in the general education subsidy has a significant impact on the change of t in these countries. Conversely, in relatively low TFP country, such as Hungary, the demand for general skills is not as large and, hence, the subsidy for general education has less impact on t .
Sensitivity analysis
In Section 5.2, we set α = 0.7 as a benchmark by considering that α represents the labor share of the final product. The rationale behind this assumption is that the revenue of each intermediate firm is divided between workers and the entrepreneurs and, thus, α is equal to the labor share of total output. However, the final good production function is defined as the relation between the quantity of inputs of intermediate goods, y i , the fixed factor, M, and the quantity of outputs, Y t . Thus, the value of the share parameter α will vary according to what M represents (however, note that the results in Table 4 are not affected by the value of M). Rather than defining M, we check the sensitivity of the results to other values of α. In Table 5 and Table 6 , we report the results of the sensitivity analysis for α = 0.6 and α = 0.8, respectively. The tables show that our argument, thus far, does not depend on the value of α. That is, even at α = 0.6 and α = 0.8, we still observe positive impacts of a general education subsidy on GDP for all countries, and find especially large values for countries with a higher transferability premium and that are closer to the frontier.
Discussion
In Section 5, we show the cross-country differences in the impact of increasing subsidies for general education on GDP. Although our analysis focuses on public education expenditures (subsidies) for the sake of simplicity, this is just one of many other possible policies in reality. Actually, countries differ substantially in their education systems and, thus, effective policies may also differ between countries. In this section, we consider these institutional differences in the education system in each country and discuss a relatively broad strategy for expanding general education. 100  0  94  6  France  91  9  84  16  88  12  79  21  Germany  96  4  60  40  75  25  86  14  Hungary  92  8  90  10  91  9  63  37  Netherlands  92  8  59  41  68  32  70  30  Slovak Republic  84  16  90  10  88  12  76  24  Slovenia  89  11  91  9  90  10  87  13  Spain  87  13  95  5  90  10  69  31  Switzerland  100  0  55  45  67  33  United Kingdom  76  24  90  10  80  20  57  43  Average  91  9  82  18  86  14  79  21 
Public/private expenditure ratio
First, we should note that higher education in many European countries is generally publicly funded. As show in Table 7 , the ratio of public expenditure on higher education, on average, is 79% in the 12 countries used in our analysis, and it is much higher than those in other developed countries, such as the United States (36%), Canada (52%), Japan (35%) and South Korea (32%) (OECD). That is to say, even today, private expenditure on higher education is sufficiently low in these European countries and, thus, the marginal increase in the ratio of public to private spending on higher education may not have a large effect on the share of general education. In exceptional cases, however, countries with a low share of public expenditure, such as the United Kingdom, Hungary and Spain, may be able to expand general education through public financial support. Next, let us focus on upper secondary education. As in the case of higher education, the ratio of public to private expenditure on upper secondary education in European countries tends to be higher than those in other regions: in the 12 countries, the average ratio of public expenditure on upper secondary education is 91% for general programs and 82% for vocational programs. However, it is sometimes argued that school-based vocational training in upper secondary education is often more expensive than other programs because of the high cost of instructional materials, equipment, and physical facilities (Westergaard and Rasmussen 1999) . Therefore, a lower government expenditure on upper secondary vocational programs is a potential way to enhance general education.
Subsidies or tax incentives for apprenticeship
As a low-cost alternative to school-based vocational education, in several European countries, apprenticeships are considered an attractive form of learning as they simultaneously enhance skills and prepare the students for jobs and careers. Apprenticeship is an education system that combines specific education in vocational schools with on-the-job training in firms. The overall public expenditure cost of an apprenticeship tends to be lower than that of school-based vocational education because students spend part of their time in work placements and further receive wages. Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have a large number of vocational education students enrolled in apprenticeships and, thus, the ratio of public expenditure on upper secondary vocational program are lower in these countries. Even in apprenticeship programs, however, the cost of off-the-job training for students is met with public funds. In addition, in order to encourage employers to participate in apprenticeship programs, governments often provide financial incentives to employers who hire apprentices. For example, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands provide (or have provided) tax deductions for firms that offer apprenticeships. (In Austria, tax incentives were abolished in 2008 and replaced by targeted subsidies. Tax exemption in the Netherlands was also abolished in 2014.) Further, firms with apprentices can be subsidized by the government in most countries providing apprenticeship programs (see Kuczera 2017).
Ability differences and school tracking
In general, individuals choosing vocational education or apprenticeship programs tend to have lower ability or lower basic skills than those in general education. Sometimes, vocational schools are perceived as a safety net for students with poor academic performance and early school dropouts. In Switzerland, for example, with regard to the PISA reading test performance, only 42% of high performers (level 4 or 5) entered a vocational training, whereas 70% of students with middle scores (level 2 or 3) enrolled in vocational education (see Meyer 2003) . This means that a student's educational pathway depends largely on their achievement before the start of the selection into school tracking.
A further argument is that, once students are tracked into general and vocational education pathways, access to tertiary general education is largely restricted to those who have completed general secondary education. In particular, countries with early tracking into lower secondary education institutes (such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland) tend to have a smaller share of general education compared to countries with more comprehensive education systems (such as the United states and the United Kingdom). It is sometimes argued that reducing or postponing early tracking may increase university attendance, although there is no clear evidence on such effects of early tracking on enrollment in higher general education. Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2010) focus on a Romanian educational reform that postponed the start of tracking in secondary education. They showed that although students with less-advantaged backgrounds were significantly more likely to finish an academic track and become eligible to apply for university after the reform, this did not have an effect on university completion. In Sweden, Hall (2012) evaluated a policy change in 1991 that increased the academic content of all vocational schooling and showed that it did not affect enrollment in university studies. The main conclusion from these authors is that reducing or postponing tracking alone, without any change in the tertiary education scheme, is not sufficient to improve access to tertiary education.
Further discussion
Although we have focused on the productivity-transferability trade-off, there are some other important discussions on trade-offs between general and specific skills. Here, we provide a brief introduction to the literature on "skill obsolescence" and "school-to-work transition."
While we assume that general skills are transferable across firms, they are sometimes defined as skills that are adaptable to new technologies. In general, general academic education is considered to provide broad knowledge and serve as a basis for further (on-the-job) learning. Thus, general skills are considered to be important, especially in an economy undergoing rapid technical change, because they enable students to easily apply such skills to future new technologies (e.g. Kumar 2004a, 2004b) . On the other hand, specific skills result in higher performances at earlier periods of a worker's career, but the initial gain could be offset when occupational skills become obsolete with time due to the emergences of new technologies (e.g. Hanushek et al. 2017) . Although the present model does not consider skill obsolescence, our calibration results might reflect the effects of such obsolescence of specific skills. In the numerical section, we used the wage gap between general and vocational education graduates for those aged 25-64, but we observe from the data that older workers are more likely to experience a large wage gap than those in the younger age group. The largest difference in the wage premium between young and old is observed in Germany (156.9%), and Hungary is the only country in the sample in which the general education wage premium decreases with age (94.1%; see Table 8 ). Thus, the effect of skill obsolescence may have some impact on the estimated value of γ in our calibration. Adults with income from employment; upper secondary education = 100.
The second perspective is the difference of "school-to-work transition" between general and vocational education graduates. Youth unemployment was (is) one of the major concerns in many European countries after the Great Recession of 2008-2009, but cross-country differences are found within it. There is some evidence that countries with a high share of vocational education program, especially in apprenticeships, tend to have a smooth transition of young people from school to work (See for example, Arum and Shavit (1995) , Ryan (2001) , and Wolter and Ryan (2011)) 20 . However, just as with wages, there is an age pattern in employment. The initial employment advantage of young workers with apprenticeships decreases with age (See for example, Stenberg and Westerlund (2015) and Hanushek et al. (2017) ). Thus, there may be a trade-off between short-term and long-term costs and benefits of vocational training (or apprenticeships) versus general education: vocational programs may facilitate school-to-work transitions, but their initial gains could be offset by skill obsolescence.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a growth model where the composition of general and specific skills changes during a country's catching up process to the world technology frontier. The key element underlying the growing importance of general skills in the development process is the increasing uncertainty about private sector productivity. Given the assumption that firms' innovation activities are riskier than copying and adopting existing technology, more developed countries, which have to put greater effort into innovation, face a higher productivity risk. This results in firms' precautionary demand for transferable workers who are adaptable to the unexpected sectoral changes. Thus, the proposed model predicts that firms place more importance on transferability than they do on productivity for labor skills, and that their demand for general skills increases as the country approaches the world technology frontier.
However, contrary to the models' prediction, many of most developed and industrialized countries in Europe have a small share of general education. A number of studies have examined the European educational composition and, in some cases, find a need for an expansion of general education. To the best of our knowledge, this study serves first attempt to examine the relationship between the educational composition and growth performance of the economy by focusing on the productivity-transferability trade-off between general and specific types of education. Our numerical analysis shows that a marginal increase in general education expenditure increases the steady-state GDP for all 12 European countries in our data. Interestingly, the cross-country comparison does not show a clear relationship between countries' initial share of the general education population and the impact of general education expenditure on GDP. On the other hand, the results show that the demand relative to the supply of general skills is larger in higher TFP countries, and that the impact of general education expenditure is positively related to countries' TFP levels. These findings suggest that the distance to the world technology frontier is relevant to the debate on secondary and tertiary schooling structures. The results also indicate the possibility of an over-specialization in skills in countries at higher stages of development.
The arguments on cross-country comparisons in this study can be extended to cross-industry comparisons. Although the present model ignores sectoral differences in the distance to the frontier, the cross-industry variance of sectoral TFP levels within a country might be not small. Thus, there may exist large differences in the demand for general skills between industries, in which case, general skills will be more required in welldeveloped and/or highly innovative industries. The maximization problem is linear in s t and, hence, the non-negative constraint g L,t ≥ 0 has to be binding. Thus, we have g L,t = 0.
Appendix B: proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1
From (18), we have that / > 0 requires that
Combining (33) and (20), we have that a t−1 must satisfy the following inequality:
(1 + ) 1− 1+ .
Solving the above inequality with respect to a t−1 yields
≡̂.
Further, in order to guarantee the existence of general skills,̂< 1 must hold. Rearranging the condition yields
≡.
Appendix C: proof of Proposition 2
From (21), we have that the dynamics of a t satisfy / −1 > 0, 2 / 2 −1 > 0, and that = 1+ > 0 when −1 = 0. That is, a t is increasing and convex in a t−1 , and has a positive intercept. Thus, the dynamics of a t have at most two steady-state points. As shown in the figure below, if two steady-state points exist, the one with a lower value is stable and the larger one is unstable. A condition for the existence of a unique and stable steady state in the interval (0, 1] is that −1 ≥ 1 at a t = 1. Substituting this condition into (21) , and rearranging, yields 
≡.
Finally, because μ must satisfy ∈ (,), we have to check whether̂<̄holds. Substitutinĝand̄intô <, and rewriting, yields The left-hand side of the above inequality decreases in γ and is equal to 0 when γ → 1. On the other hand, the right-hand side increases in γ and is equal to 0 when γ → π. That is, γ has to be large enough to ensure that <. From the above discussion, there existŝ∈ ( , 1), such that̂<̄holds for ∈ (̂, 1). Note that / < is required for the existence of an interior solution, that is, for the existence of G-skill workers. Combining this condition with (5), we have
We focus on the equilibrium that satisfies the condition given in (36), in which both G-skill and S-skill workers exist. Section 5 showed that all estimates obtained from our calibration satisfy (36). Finally, the first-order condition of this problem yields
Rearranging (34) and (37) by evaluating at the steady state and substituting , = /(1 + ) yields (24) and (25).
Appendix E: proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix, we examine the steady-state characteristics using the system given in (27) and (29). We first show that the steady-state values, g * and a * , increase in. Let us denote as (, * ) the solution of (27) with respect to g * , as a function of a * and. From (27), we have that (, * ) increases in both̃and a * . Substituting * = (, * ) into (29) yields
(1 + ) * − = (1 − ) 2 1 + (1 + − (, * )) ( * ) 2− .
Here, a * is determined from the above expression. The left-hand side (LHS) of the above expression is increasing and is a linear function of a * with a negative intercept. At the same time, the right-hand side (RHS) increases in a * , and passes through the origin. However, we cannot examine the number of intersections between the LHS and RHS curves because very little is known about the shape of the RHS function. However, we have that if the LHS and the RHS curves have one or more intersections, the value of the smallest steady-state increases in. This means that the smallest steady-state point of a increases iñand, thus, it becomes clear that * = (, * ) increases in. The steady-state point is described in the figure below.
Next, we investigate the stability of the steady state corresponding to the smallest solution of a * . Let us denote as g t the total number of G-skill workers in equilibrium, but not in the steady state. Then, substituting , = , = 1 − , and , = into (34) and (35) 
